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Introduction
In an economy where public intewentions are in constant decrease in almost all the sectors,
national and European public interventions in the French fishing industry remain numerous.
Indeed since the start of the nineties the weight of public grants, in this sector, has been
getting more and more significant in France with by consequently, an increase of the
complexity of the public assistance system. At the moment, there exist three levels of public
interventions. Thus, if the European Union @U) provides some allocations, the French
government allots grants too- Moreover local communities (regions and departments), even if
they have a lower budget at their disposal, are great suppliers ofsubsidies too.
Public assistance to the French fishing industry includes budgetary and non-budgetary
assistance (protectionism, acc€ss to resources, derogatory arrangements concerning
competition. .. ).
In this paper we focus on budgetary assistance which is usually more simple to qumtify.
Budget subsidies can be distinguished into varied grants: some ofthem are public expenses
while the others are fiscal subsidies. The latter is of considerable importance but will not be
considered in our study which is focused on public expenses and more particularly on public
expenses aimed at structural actions. Two kinds of structural actions are financed by public
funding. Financial support can be allocated for the construotion and modemisation of fishing
vessels to ensure the competitiveness of the fleet but grant aid can be allocated to eliminate
excess capacity too.(Giguelay, I 999)
In this presentation we focus, on public amounts given out to encourage fishermen to end
their activity by scrapping their vessel or export them out of the Community waters.
The objective of this contribution is to underline some numerous assets of the Data
envelopment Analysis (DEA) method in the evaluation of the performance of the
decommissioning scheme policy introduced in the French legislation at the beginning of the
nineties in order to reduce French fishing fleet capacity. Even if this paper is a preliminary
analysis to present data and DEA models tltat we are going to use, it allows to present DEA
models specified in an original context far from the traditional theory of production. The
paper is organised as follows:
In a first time we are interested in the reasons why decommissioning schemes were launched
in France.
Then we introduce some questions regarding this public action by presenting data and models
we are going to use.
I Decommissioning scheme: a new tool in French oublic interyentions
I I Overcapitalisation and public intervention
The introduction of withdrawals' policy in the fisheries sector comes from the peculiarities of
fish resource. Indeed, sea fishes are a natural, renewable and mobile resource whose
reproduction and movements cannot be controlled. Fish resource is a common resource. So no
one can own fishes until they have been captured. Equally every fish that is taken from the sea
is one fewer available to dte rest of fishermen. These two above properties of fish resource are
commonly called non-exclusivity and soustractibility (Berkes, 1989). The combination of
these properties naturally leads to a phenomenon of overcapitalisation. This combination
supplies some negative externalities between fishermen who exploit a same fish stock.
Consequently, every fisherman is vulnerable to the actions of ttre other catchers.
These peculiarities of fish resource leads to a situation of overcapacity which is the natural
consequence of the exploitation even if the natural exploitation is not efficient. .(Giguelay,
Boncoeur, 1999)
r flilI ililIilIil illlt ilIil llilt lill lilt*005019x
Typhaine Gieuelav
CEDEM. Université de Bretaette Occidentale
12. rue de Kerçoat, BP 816, 29285 Brest cedex. France
Typh ain e. gi gu e I ay @un iv -b re s t.fr
Isabelle Piot-Lepetit
INRA-Economie,
Rue Adolphe Bobierre, CS 61 I 03, 3501 I Rennes cedex, France
I sa b e I I e.P i o t@roa zh o n. i n ra rfr
t
Overcapitalisation, which rnduces smaller stocks, would lead to endanger fishermen. That is
why the European Commission tries to obtain a better balance between vessels and fish
resource available. Overfishing due to overcapitalisation is a real threat for fish and for
fishermen too! This justifies the necessity of a public intervention in order to decrease fishing
capacity.
12 Weight of decommissioning schemes in public subsidies
The European structuml policy of the Common fisheries policy introduced in 1983 the first
Multi-arurual guidance program (MAGP) with the main goal of limiting the excess of fishing
capacity. Even if overfishing and fish stock decline was obvious, this first progrirm had a very
low impact on the European flect structue. Nobody was really concemed by fishing resource
protection.
However, at the beginning of the nineties the actors of ttre fishing industry and the state
members become aware of the fact that there are too many vessels in the European Union for
the frsh availability. This new awareness of the overcapitalisæion appears when the European
Commission threat stale-members which do not decrease the fishing effort of their fleet to
suppress ttreir subsidies for new vessels' construction. It was up to each member state to
decide how to reach the restricting targets agreed in the MAGp.
In March l99l the French govemment chooses to introduce a policy of public financial
incentives to boat decommissioning to meet the European requirements of the 2nd MAGP
conceming fleet capacity reductions for the period 1987-1991. The launch of the first
decommissioning scheme 
-known as "ttre Mellick Plan" was intended to reduce the porer
capacity of the French fleet of l\o/o.The aim was to withdraw as quickly as possible more
than 100.000 kW.
The idea was to scrap vessels, to use them in other sectors or to transfer vessels outside
Commmity waters.
Sinæ 1993, several ottrer plans w€re adopted, aiming like the first one at fulfilling European
fleet capacity reduction targets but the first scheme stays the plan where the higher amounts of
grants lvere allocated. Indeed financial support to decommissioning, which had fallen in
relative and absolute terms after the achievement of the "Mellick Plan" at the beginning of the
decade, increased again with the new schemes which were launched from 1993, without
reaching the level of I 991 .
The following tables depict the place taken by decommissioning schemes (in bold characters)
within the general frame of EU and Govemment assistance to the French fishing industry and
aquaculture over the period I 99 l - I 996 (MAP, 1997) :
Table l. Evolution ofEU and Frenoh govemment expenditures in aid ofthe French lishing industry
and aquaculture, 1991-1996 (millions of constant 1996 FF)
Calculated ûom MAP 1997 (INSEE 1997/l the price index)
Table 2. EU and French government exp€nditues in aid of the French lishing industry and
aquaculture.
Yearly average 199l-1996 (constant French Francs)
of constants 1996 French Francs from MAP 1997 G{SEE l997ll for the price
index).
With an average of 56 million French Francs per year, the amounts allocated by ùe EU and
ttre French Government to decommissioning schemes represent only slightly more than l% of
the total expenditures of these authorities in aid to the sector over the period l99l-96.
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The financing of decommissioning schemes represents 13% of the total EU and Govemment
expenditures for the'txploitation ofnalural resources" area (not including aquacutture), far
behind subsidies to investment (representing 50% of ttre whole set, and constituted up to 98%
by direct subsidies to ship building or modemising and by compensation of reduced interest
rates of loans to fishing firms), and support to landing pnces (24% of the whole set).
(Giguelay, Boncoeur, 1999)
Thus it appeam that, during the period under survey, EU and government subsidies, aiming at
reducing the pressure on fish stocks, were ouûlumbered by subsidies liable to have the
opposite effect. This phenomenon will have to be taken into account to interpret some results
of our models. The priority stays the investment and the competitiveness of the fleet.
1,3 Characteristics of the decommissioning schemes.
The evaluation of a public action is not always simple. Some different parameters and
constraints have to be taken into consideration. In the case ofthe policy offinancial incentives
launched by the French govemment to withdraw vessels from French fleet, the direct effects
of the scheme are obvious enough to bring to the fore. Indeed the withdrawal of a vessel is the
directconsequence ofthe allocalion ofthe grand aid. Thus, it is possible to quantifr the direct
effects ofthe financial support. In the evaluation of a public action it is not always the case.
For example, a region launches a program of public subvention to increase employment.
(Badillo, Romain, 1999). Some months later a raising of the employrnent can be underscore.
The cause of ttris fact is probably not the program alone, some other factors can explain this
increase (the revival in the economics..) Moreover, it is diffrcult to define the opportune time
to evaluate the impact of this policy.
ln the case of French decommissioning schemes the judicious moment of the evaluation is
when every vessels are withdrawn consequently to the allocation of the grand aid.
Thus we can provide a "real" evaluation ofthe French decommissioning schemes.
French public decommissioning schemes can be appraised according to two points of view
The instigator of the public measrues appraised the effects of the action but fishermen who
benefit by this program have an opinion and their own appraisal ofthe public action too.
In this paper we made up our mind to assess the consequences of the launch of
decommissioning schemes according to the only view of the public actors which financed
these programs. From a public point of view, this study provides an evaluation of the
performance of subsidies, involved in the decommissioning scheme policy, in reducing
fishing capacily.
This approach rests on an ex-post evaluation of the launch of a decommissioning scheme.
This analysis will be based on the use of different input-oriented DEA modelsr. (Chames,
Cooper, Rhodes, 1978), (Banker, Cooper, Charnes, 1984)
Let us underline the original use of these models. Most of the time, they attracl economists'
interest in aproduction context. How produce better? How produce cheaper?
In our study the target is the suppression of the capacity of production! This kind of poliry
remains relatively rare.
2 Data and models
2.lData
The first decommissioning schemes will be the subject of our study for two reasons. It
inaugurated the beginning of the use of a new tool and it was the most important scheme
launched in term of money.
The choice to assess the performance of public subsidies by using the DEA method needs to
define inputs and outputs used in the different models.
So three kinds of subsidies are allocated to each fisherman who wants to withdraw his vessel
from the French fleet. These subsidies have to take into account not only the cost ofthe vessel
but also the psychological cost of ttre end of his activity for the fisherman too.
These subsidies have to be just incentive enough to incite fishermen to withdraw their vessels
from fleet. Thus, the inputs are the three gand aids allocated by the French state, by the
region of Brittany and by the department of Morbihan. Indeed the first decommissioning
scheme was co-financed by French govemment and local communities (regions and
departments).
It was necessary to collect data by getting in touch with each region and departmen! a task
which up to now has been undertaken only for the region of Brittany and the department of
Morbihan.
I In itrther research the use oF output-oriented DEA models witl enable us to exploit fhe DEA method in a
decision perspective. The fixed funding will le.ad us to evaluate the fishing capacity which could have been
eliminated in the scope of a decommissioning scheme. At the same time we will assess the performance of the
policy according to the point ofview ofthe fishermen.
Brittany was not chosen simply for practical reasons of proximity, but mainly for its
prominent position in the French fishing industry.
We shall therefore limit our presentation to the department of Morbihan for which a complete
set of data conceming public subsidies at lhe national, regional and department levels has
been collected. (Giguelay, Boncoeur, I999)
However the official aim of the schemes is not the withdrawal of vessels but the destruction
of the excess of fishing capacity2. It is worth withdrawing a very powerfrd vessel than two
little smdl fishing boats if the state really wants to get the requirements of the European
Commission.
A recent report of the European Commission brings to the fore the fact that the decrease of the
fishing capacity can represent a good indicator of the reduction of fishing effort even if
fishing effort is defined as capacity multiplied by activity expressed in days spent at sea.
Thus, we take account of technical attributes of vessels to assess a certain decreæe of fishing
effort.
For each vessel scrapped, we have collected its attributes. The capacity ofa fishing vessel is
measured according to its size (tonnage, length), the power of its engines and the age of tre
vessel which is an indirect indicator of the measure of the fishing effort too. Indeed, new
vessels have greater fishing power than old ones thanks to advances in technology. The
impact of technological progress on the fishing capacity of the fleet is real. Thw, four outputs
will be taken into account to evaluate ttre eliminating of excess capacity.
The table below sum up the inputs and outputs collected for 69 vessels.
Table 3. Variable description
2.2 Models
Consider lhere are N vessels scrapped in the scope of the first decommissioning scheme in the
deparhnent of Morbihan and P subsidies allocated by the French public institutions (the
French state, the region of Brittany, the department of Morbihan) to withdraw, from the fleet,
C fishing capacity.
Note r" > 0 the amount of subsidies p allocated to the owner of the vessel j to withdraw it
from the fleet and 
./a 2 0 the fishing capacity c eliminated by the fisherman j in tlre scope of
the decommissioning scheme.
The interest of the society is that public authorities larmch the less expensive policies as
possible.
A decommissioning scheme is deemed inefficient when a lower level of subsidies would have
led to a higher or an equal fishing capacity reduction.
In political context the questorl which guides our interpretation of the results, is : could the
same fishing capacity reduction be obtained with a lower amount of public financing? (the
fishing capacity is reduced in this model to the power engine of the vessel). Notice that a
positive answer to this question do not always mean that the policy is inefficient. We will
come back on this cerûain contradiction below...
The fint model is an input-oriented model wittr 3 inputs (the grand aid allocated by the
French Statg the region of Brittany and the department of Morbihan). In order to meet the
first requirernents of the European Community, which goal is to reduce the power of the
European fleet, we just consider I output the power engine of the vessel expressed in kW.
We can underline thar reducing fishing capacity to the power of the vessel is not very
rigorous. A vessel can be fewer powerful and can bring a high pressure on lhe fish resource if
its tonnage is importan! it depends on the kind of fishing activity practised.
Subsidies
from French
state (French
Franc)
Input I
Subsidies from
the Region of
Brittany
(French Franc)
krput 2
Subsidies from
the Region of
Morbihan
(FrenchFranc)
Input 3
I-ength of the
vessel (meter)
Output I
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the vessel
(GRT)
Output 2
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power of
the vessel
(k!v)
Output 2
Construction
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Outpur 4
2 The elimination ofthe excess ofcapacity is an intermediary goal. The real aim is to preserve fish resource to
insure the durabilityof the activity of fishermen.
Model I:
TheJishing capacity eliminated is represented by only one attlibute : ,he polryer4ngine.
Iæt us consider a vessel t (f = 1..."f).
v* and r"r will be the weigha dercrmined for every variable by the solution of tre model for
the vessel Ë. For each vessel we search ttre weights which maximise the efficienry of the
vessel according to the official view of the public actors.
The model can be defined as followb
Mmwr= gr
Vt
E, 
-lv rox . <0 i = 1,...,J (Xn)
v
,r=l (h,) (l)
Er20
urr>A p= 1,...,P
The subject of this model is to reduce to a single dimension the three subsidies allocated by
the public suppliers. We construct a single "virhral'subsidy.
In this non-parametric analysis, the mathematical programme consists in J optimisations (one
for each vessel withdrawn in the scope of the scheme.)
ra. is the radial measwe of the technical efficiency which projects an 'lnefticient" vessel on
the efficient frontier (accordng the public suppliers..)
In this model the efficiency score of an efficient vessels will show a value of l(this value is
inferior to I for the inefficient vessels). This efticient vessel is on the technical ûontier, it is
efficient according the Farrell definition.
A variable retwns to scale âssumplion is made since we c:mnot assume the existence of a
proportionality between the allocated $ants and the eliminæed fishing capacity.
So we obtain the following model:
Min h,
s/t
28,
p= 1,...,P 1vr*)
ZAn=l (p) (2)
xn2o i = 1,...,J
hr.f'""
We add at the dual form of the model I the constraint:
J
LAn=l
i=l
which represents the assumption ofvariable retums to scale.
- 7,r' i the intensity variable of the vessel È associated wittr the wittrdrav'rn vessel 7,
- 4: efficiencyscore.
A vessel &will be efficient on two conditions : every variable will be equal to 0 excepted 2o
and &. which will be equal to I while a vessel & is inefficient if i, is less than writy.
As regards the inefficient vessels, lhe ).n will be equal to 0 excepted when the vessel 7 is
used to construct a '"virtual vessel" wittr which the vessel /c can be compared. we try to
minimise the subsidies allocated to this "virtual vessel" which would be a linear combination
of ûre real efficient vessels which enter the construction of this "virtual" vqssel.
In order to obtain an efficient allocatiorq the non-efficie,nt vessel would have to present all the
attributes of the "virtual vessel".
J
,.x..8
I
LAnr, + hrxo>0
.xprI
Model II: Even if they are very interesting, the results of these models present certain limits.
Indeed the first one is thatthe projection on the frontier is not pareto-optimal. This projection
is based on the Debreu-Farrell measure of the efiiciency which presents problems when the
section of the piecewise linear frontier nm parallel to the a;<es. (Fanell, 1957)
The non-radial measurement allows us to find a pareto-optimal efficient projected point
according to Koopmans.(Koopmarrs, I 95 I )
The inhoduction provided by the slacks variables leads to determine a pareto-efficient
projection on the frontier.
In this paper we consider the following model which inhoduces slacks variables in the
previous models:
The Jishing capcity eliminated is represented by only one attribute : the tonnage.
This programme can be solved by using the tonnage as the only one representation of the
fishing capacity of the vessel. lndeed the French schemes allocate subsidies in frrnction of the
tonnage of the vessel even if thery want to reduce the power of the fleet. Thus, the same model
as presented above is computed by using the tonnage as the only output or representation of
the fishing capacity of the vessel.
Then, it will be interesting to compare the results provided by of the models I and II.
Model III:
The Jishing capacity eliminated is represented by every technical attribute of the vessels Model IV:
Introduction of slack variable s
The fshing capacity eliminated is represented by only one attribute : the power-engine.The model presented below deems to be the most realist model in function of the official
targets announced. Indeed every attribute (engttr, tonnage, power-engine and construction
year of the vessel) is taken into account to evaluate the fishing capacity of a vessel. Even if
the fishing capacity is not the fishing effort, the capacity of a vessel can be considered as a
good indicator of the pressue on the fish stocks of a vessel. So in these models we construct a
"vfutual" output thanls all atfibutes ofthe vessels.
Minhr-<Ér; *Ës;l
s/t
i^nt, -sï =8,
Min hr
-f^n*, +hrxo-So =0 p= 1,...,p
vt
J
LAùo 2!oc=I,...,C (u*) Et'=t
lnà0 j = 1,.-.,J
s; >o
Sn>0 p= 1,...,P
(4)
-Zxn,, + hrx*> 0 p= 1,...,P lvrr')
LLn=I (p) (3)
Ln20 i = 1,...,J fr"e
Every constraint is presented in equalities form.
Two slacks' vector are introduced:
- Si e R*c : slack variables linked to constraints on fishing capacity eliminæed. (In this first
model we consider only one technical æribute of the vessel withdrawn ; the power-
engine)
h, f'"e
Min h, 
-
s1t
câ(t
- ,S; e/{ : slack variables linked to constraints on subsidies allocated;
and a which is a non Archimedian Quantity.
So a vessel is efficient according to Koopmans in this model iÎ n, =1 and if simultaneously all
slack variables are equal to 0.
Model IY:
Introduct i on of s lack var i ab les
The Jishing capacity eliminated is represented by only one attribute : the tonnage.
The same model as presented above is computed by using the tonnage as the only output or
representation ofthe fishing capacity ofthe vessel.
Model Y:
Introduction of slack variables
Ihe JÏshing capcity eliminated is represented by every technical attribute of the vessels
Conclusion
Results provided by these models will allow us to analyse the effrciency of the
decommissioning schemes according to the score obtained by the different vessels involved in
the scheme. Let us consider some possible analysis
ln a first time, a comparison of the results of the fust models (model I, model II and model
III) will be necessary to appreciate the logic ofthe tables based on the tonnage as regards lhe
objective which is to decreasethe power-engine of the fleet!
Then a second stage of the study will be to find some relation between in the hand the
efficient vessels and in the other hand the non-efficient ones in order to determine the real
targets of the launch of the decommissioning schemes.
Iæt's suppose thal the policy is not efficient as regards a category of vessels, it will be
interesting to analyse this inefficiency. Perhaps this inefficienry is not a real inelficiency but
an incentive means to convince some reticent fishermen to end their activities...
Finally, the last three models which introduce the slack variables will be particularly
interesting to underline the windfall effects which are omnipresent in the results of this kind
of policy but which are very difficult to prove. ln the scope of the first decommissioning
schemes, we suppose that the omers of the old vessels benefited by a windfall effect as
regards their age. They would have received too much money regard to their age. The
combination of a low score and a positive slack variable on the construction year of ùe vessel
would justify the windfall effect...
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